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Corruption, Political Instability and Sustainable 
Development: The Interlinkages 








The study empirically probed the interdependence among corruption, 
political instability and sustainable development for a panel of 28 
developing economies and disaggregated sample of lower-middle 
and upper-middle income economies for the time period 2000-2014. 
The three stage least square (3SLS) estimation revealed that 
corruption negatively affects sustainable development and political 
instability. The political instability impedes sustainable development 
and corruption. The sustainable development reduces political 
instability and corruption. It explains that corruption enhances 
political stability and political stability increases corruption. The 
disaggregated estimates of developing economies are almost same as 
aggregate estimates of developing economies, however political 
instability has statistically insignificant effect on sustainable 
development in upper-middle-income economies. To go forward for 
sustainable development, the elimination of corruption is imperative.  
Keywords: corruption, political instability, sustainable 
development, income inequality, resource curse, sand the wheels 
JEL Classifications: D72, O11, O15, Q01 
1. Introduction 
Corruption has perilous implications for the economies but in developing 
economies it particularly has detrimental impacts on socioeconomic 
indicators. In various forms it retards economic growth (Tanzi & 
Daveoodi, 1998; Mo, 2001; Meon & Sekkat,  2005; Venard, 2013), 
destabilize governments (Mbaku & Paul, 1989; Abu, Karim & Aziz, 
2015), harms foreign direct investment (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), 
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decreases public and private sector investment (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; 
Meon & Sekkat, 2005; Mo, 2001), reduces human capital (Mo, 2001), 
increases poverty (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002) and 
adversely affects sustainable development (Dietz, Neumayer & De 
Soysa, 2007; Aidt, 2010; Venard, 2013). However, the corruption may 
promote economic growth, the idea stems from Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968). Burdhan (1997) empirically supported it for Europe. 
Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) illustrated that corruption may 
raise the economic efficiency and ultimately the economic growth. Meon 
and Weill (2010) supported the phenomenon of negative effect of 
corruption on economic growth for the countries having inefficient 
political institutions. The corruption increases economic growth is also 
empirically proved by Piplica and Covo (2011) for Croatia (see also 
Huang, 2016 for South Korea).  
Corruption existed in different political, administrative, judicial 
and legislative institutions even in army declines the magnitude and 
quality of social, human and physical capital formation, which increases 
poverty, social and economic disparity, and environmental degradation 
and ultimately declines sustainable development. It also leads to social 
displeasure, protests, strikes, political violence and consequently political 
instability in the country (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002).  
Political instability creates political and bureaucratic corruption. 
Politically weak governments bribe their rivals and bureaucrats to sustain 
their governments which penetrate to the gross root level (Abu, Karim & 
Aziz, 2015). The magnitude of political instability directly and 
proportionally affects the degree of corruption in the economies (Park, 
2003).  
The politically unstable environment may affect sustainable 
development through irrational political and economic decision making 
which reduces private investment, public sector programs, pattern of 
public spending and economic growth (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Jong-A-
Pin, 2009). It adversely affects the taxation, debt and inflation (Aisen & 
Veiga, 2013). Political instability devastates environment for the 
economies to have sustainable development by a variety of channels like 
restricting capital formation - both physical and human- capital flight, 
brain drain, devastating institutions, glass curtain on media freedom and 
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restricting the mass information and awareness for the people (Alesina, 
Ozler, Robini & Swagel, 1996)
3
. 
Sustainable development has economic, social and 
environmental dimensions and discourages corruption and political 
instability. It increases public welfare and discourages rent-seeking 
behavior of the people. Sustainable development also contributes to 
political stability through lowering the opportunity of unconstitutional 
government change, frequent switching of political parties by the 
parliamentarians and social unrest. Most of all, one of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the 6
th
 goal focusses to promote peaceful and 
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice 
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels. One of the key targets of this goal is to substantially reduce 
corruption and bribery in all its forms.  
A plethora of the studies has focused on corruption and 
economic growth (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998; Mo, 2001; Meon & Sekkat, 
2005; Peplica & Covo, 2011), political instability and corruption (Serra, 
2006; Compante, Chor & Do, 2009) as well as political instability and 
economic growth (Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Abu, Karim & Aziz, 2015). The 
need is to focus on sustainable development rather than economic 
development as the sustainable development is the prime objective of the 
nations to secure good living conditions for their future generations and 
current environment for life, economy and culture that guarantees long 
run sustainability. Additionally, the corruption, political instability and 
sustainable development are interlinked. None of these studies have 
focused on simultaneous analysis of corruption, political instability and 
sustainable development for developing economies. However, Abu, 
Karim and Aziz (2015) analyzed corruption, political instability and 
economic development simultaneously for West Africa. The sustainable 
development is a wider and multidimensional concept than economic 
growth. It incorporates the needs of the current generation and the future 
generations economically, socially and ecologically. Sustainable 
development captures not only the economic dimension but social and 
environmental dimension as well. This is the gap being filled by the 
current study through empirically investigating the interlinkage among 
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corruption, political instability and sustainable development rather than 
economic growth for a sample of developing economies.  
Measuring corruption, political instability and sustainable 
development is a puzzle for the researchers due to multi-dimensionality 
of these concepts. A variety of proxies, indicators and indices have been 
used for their measurement in the literature. For instance, corruption is 
measured by Graft Index and corruption perception index
4
 (Serra, 2006), 
control of corruption (Venard, 2013) and corruption perception index 
(Gyimah-Brempong & De Camacho, 1998; Farooq, Shahbaz, Arouri & 
Teulon, 2013; Abu, Karim & Aziz, 2015).   
Similarly political instability is measured by an index
5
 (Alesina 
& Perotti, 1996; Abu, Karim & Aziz, 2015), number of violent political 
events like strikes, riots, assassination or coups (Clemens & Siermann, 
1998), number of government changes (Bienen & Van de Walle, 1991) 
and probability of government change estimated by bogit model 
(Alesina, Ozler, Robini & Swagel, 1996). In addition, four dimensions of 
political instability, i.e. politically motivated violence, mass political 
violence, instability within the political regime and instability of the 
political regime (Jong-A-Pin, 2009), number of assassinations and the 
number of revolutions (Mo, 2001), two dimensions of political 
instability, i.e. regime instability and government instability (Aisen & 
Veiga, 2013) and three proxy variables of rule of law, political stability 
index and durable index (Radu, 2015) have been used for political 
instability. 
Sustainable development is the most debatable concept with 
respect to its operationalization. It is captured by genuine saving rate 
(Auty, 2004; Dietz et al., 2007), sustainable society index (Kerk & 
Manuel, 2008), two dimensions of human development index and 
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ecological footprint
6
 (Moran, Wackernagel, Kitzes, Goldfinger & 
Boutaud, 2008), genuine wealth per capita (Aidt, 2010; Venard, 2013) 
and three-dimensional concept of sustainable development, i.e. 
economic, environmental and social (Kondyli, 2010; Abou-Ali & 
Abdelfattah, 2013). Radu (2015) measured sustainable development 
through a number of proxy indicators
7
. Nourry (2008) used eight 
measures of sustainable development to see the status of sustainable 
development in France. They are green national net product, genuine 
saving, ecological foot print, indicators of sustainable economic welfare, 
genuine progress indicators, pollution-sensitive human development 
indicators, sustainable human development indicators and French 
dashboard on sustainable development
8
. The current study attempts to 
measure the sustainable development and political instability through 
indices that is another contribution of the study.   
2. Literature Review 
In the existing literature, the studies focused on individual and groups 
of economies, using various types of operational definitions, so they 
revealed the varying results. Mo (2001) explained that corruption 
negatively impacts economic growth via human capital and political 
instability. Political instability was measured for 54 countries by the 
number of assassinations and revolutions during 1960 to 1985 with five 
years interval. However, the political instability may exist in the form 
of regime change and cabinet changes as polarization in the economies. 
It means the study has used a weak measurement of political instability.  
Meon and Sekkat (2005) tested grease the wheels hypothesis 
for a sample of 63 to 71 countries for the time period of 1970 to 1998. 
They proved that investment and economic growth are adversely 
influenced by corruption measured by two indicators, i.e. CPI index by 
Transparency International and World Bank corruption index. The 
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capita. Ecological footprint measures the magnitude of the recovering capacity of the 
biosphere. 
7
The indicators were GDP per capita, government consumption, household 
consumption, capital investment, savings, foreign direct investment, exports of 
goods and services, and imports of goods and services. 
8
Nourry (2008) highlighted that all the measures of sustainable development 
prevalent in literature have their own advantages and drawbacks.  
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study has also included the interaction term of corruption with rule of 
law and government effectiveness. It was found that weak rule of law 
and low government effectiveness make the corruption more 
detrimental to growth. Serra (2006) measured the corruption through 
Graft index by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) and corruption 
perception index by Transparency International. The study concluded 
that political stability and democracy negatively influence corruption. 
The association between corruption, resource abundance and 
genuine saving has been estimated by Dietz, Neumayer and De Soysa 
(2007)
9
. The resource rich countries are found to have a negative effect 
on genuine saving. The resource abundant countries had poor 
performance in genuine saving in contrast with resource poor countries 
because these countries insufficiently invest the resources on human 
capital and technology. In the three indicators of institutional quality, i.e. 
corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law, the corruption has 
shown a negative impact on genuine saving in interaction with resource 
abundance.  
Jong-A-Pin (2009) examined the multidimensionality of 
political instability in the perspective of implications for economic 
growth for 90 economies using unbalanced data-set with five years 
interval. For the purpose, 25 political instability indicators were 
categorized into four dimensions, i.e. politically motivated violence, 
mass civil protests, instability within the political regime, and instability 
of political regime through explanatory factor analysis. These 
dimensions had shown different effect on economic growth. The 
instability of political regime has a robust and significant negative 
effect on economic growth. It explained that this dimension measures 
de facto uncertainty. The study further evidenced that more instability 
within the political regime supports economic growth.  
Campante, Chor and Do (2009) evidenced that corruption and 
political instability are bonded in a U-shaped pattern. The intensive and 
bigger magnitude of corruption has been found in the nations 
possessing the severe political instability as well as in the nations 
having mild level of political instability. However, the corruption 
remained low in the nations living in between two extremes of political 
                                                          
9
Genuine saving is a measure of sustainable development (Auty, 2004; Dietz, 
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instability. The results were obtained by using two different measures 
of political instability, i.e. average tenure of a country’s chief executive 
and average tenure of the party in power. They were further supported 
by a more direct measure of stability, i.e. governing coalition’s share of 
seats in the legislative.  
Aidt (2010) examining the implications of corruption on 
sustainable development explained that for sustainable development, 
corruption measured by any of the criteria, is the most unfavorable and 
detrimental factor. The sustainable development was measured by 
genuine wealth per capita that captures only one aspect of sustainable 
development. The sustainable development measured by an index 
covering the aspects of nation’s economic, social and environmental 
development may enhance the contribution of the study. Piplica and 
Covo (2011) have also analyzed the influence of corruption on 
economic growth in Croatia along with ten transition European Union 
economies. They evidenced higher level of corruption in Croatia than 
ten transition countries and a positive impact of corruption on 
economic growth. However, in ten transition EU member countries 
corruption decreases the economic growth. 
Aisen and Veiga (2013) using cabinet changes as proxy variable 
for political instability and employing system-GMM on a sample of 165 
countries covering five year interval period from 1960 to 2004 showed 
that political instability decreases economic growth due to its depressing 
impact on maintaining or increasing total factor productivity and 
restricting the development of human and physical capital. The study has 
focused on change in cabinet as political instability. The change of the 
political regime, polarization and the political violence along with civil 
conflicts may be the critical factors for economic growth as Jong-A-Pin 
(2009) has included 25 political instability indicators.  
Venard (2013) measured the economic development by 
genuine wealth growth per capita and analyzed the link between 
corruption, institutional quality and economic development. It was 
evidenced that good quality of institutional framework decreases 
corruption which enhances the economic growth. It supports the sand 
the wheel theory that is corruption retards the process of economic 
development (Farooq et. al., 2013). Abu, Karim and Aziz (2015) 
evidenced that mass corruption and underdevelopment of the nations is 
attributed to political instability in ECOWAS countries. The dynamic 
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interaction among corruption, political instability and economic 
development confirmed that corruption, political instability and 
economic development are endogenous. Political instability is the most 
important variable accounting for shocks in corruption, while 
corruption is the most important variable accounting for shocks in 
political instability and economic growth. d’Agostino, Dunne and 
Pieroni (2016) have analyzed the effect of corruption interacting with 
government expenditures on economic growth for a panel of 106 
countries. The corruption was captured by the control of corruption 
index by World Bank. They concluded that interaction between 
corruption and investment, and corruption and military spending have a 
strong negative effect on economic growth. Combating the corruption 
not only have direct positive impact on economic growth but it has also 
positive indirect effect on economic growth through reducing the size 
of negative impact of military burden.   
The literature has shown varying results possibly due to 
different socioeconomic structures of the economies, economic levels 
of the countries or use of different measures of political instability and 
sustainable development. To make the results robust, it is attempted to 
estimate the interlinkages among corruption, political instability and 
sustainable development for developing economies as well as 
disaggregated economies by income group
10
 through a comprehensive 
measure of political instability and sustainable development in the form 
of indices. 
3. Methodology 
To have empirical evidence of interlinkages among corruption, political 
instability and sustainable development a system of equations has been 
designed. This framework is applied for developing economies and 
disaggregated data into lower-middle income and upper-middle income 
economies. 
3.1. Simultaneous Equations Model 
The SEM uses two types of variables in the models, i.e. the exogenous 
variables and the endogenous variables. Endogenous variables are 
variables determined within the system of equations representing the 
                                                          
10
The disaggregation of data into lower-middle income countries and upper-middle 
income countries makes to check the heterogeneity by level of income of the countries 
and to make the results robust.  
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real world (Wooldridge, 1996; Pindyck, Rubinfeld, Hall, & 
Schmukler, 1997; Wooldridge, 2009), and are functions of other 
variables present in the system. The exogenous variables are variables 
determined outside the system. As a general rule, when a variable is 
endogenous, it will be related to the perturbation term. It generates 
endogenous variables, violates the assumptions of Gauss Markov (GM) 
and distorts the OLS estimates (Wooldridge, 2009). This fact can be 
seen in equations (1) and (2), in which Y and X1 are both endogenous. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽11𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑋3,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (1) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽21𝑌1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑍1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2) 
3.2. Two-Stage Least Squares 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis (Wooldridge, 1996; 
Pindyck et al., 1997; Wooldridge, 2009) is a statistical technique that is 
used in the analysis of structural equations. It is an extension of the 
OLS method and is used when the error terms of the dependent 
variable are related to independent variables (Pindyck et al., 1997; 
Wooldridge, 2009). This technique is useful when there are feedback 
cycles in the model and the method is called "two stages" because it 
performs the two-step estimation, 
Step 1: Regress 𝑌−𝑖 on X and obtain the predicted values of ?̂?-I, 
Step 2: Estimate αi, βi by the ordinary least square regression of yi and ?̂?-I and Xi. 
3.3. Three-Stage Least Square 
The three-stage least squares method combines the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
(Wooldridge, 1996; Pindyck et al., 1997). SUR is a generalization of a 
linear regression model consisting of several regression equations. Each 
equation has its own dependent variable and potentially different sets of 
exogenous explanatory variables. Each equation is a linear regression 
valid in itself and can be evaluated separately. The model can be the 
equation of the estimated equation using ordinary standard least squares 
(OLS). These estimates are consistent, although in general they are not 
as efficient as the SUR method, with generalized least-squares feasible 
with a specific form of variance-covariance matrix. Two important 
cases when SUR is in effect equivalent to OLS are: when the error 
terms are not correlated between equations (so they are not really 
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related), or when each equation contains exactly the same set of 
regressors on the right side of the hand (Pindyck et al., 1997). 
New econometrics techniques and data mining techniques are 
available for analysis, for instance, Taylan, Weber and Ozkurt (2010) 
explained the multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) that is 
important for classification and regression. Ozmen and Weber (2012) 
discussed Generalized Partial Linear Models (GPLMs) and Ozmen, 
Batmaz and Weber (2014) Generalized Partial Linear Models 
(GPLMs) that is used for forecasting and uncertainty of models. 
Ozmen, Weber, Batmaz and Kropat (2011) examined the CMARs 
method which is useful to handle the heterogeneous and complex data. 
They suggested that if the data is uncertain which may lead to uncertain 
results so to overcome this CMARS algorithm is proposed to cope with 
data uncertainty. 
Hence the above-mentioned techniques are non-parametric 
techniques. These methods give productive results in case of nonlinear 
equations, time series analysis and especially in the heterogeneous and 
complex data i.e. big data analysis. We discussed the objective of this 
research that is to estimate the simultaneous relationship between 
corruption, political instability and sustainable development. To the 
best of our knowledge simultaneous equation model is much 
appropriate. The three stage least square gives efficient results 
according to our objective because there occurred endogeneity in the 
model and three stage least square efficiently overcame this 
endogeneity problem and gave efficient results.  
3.4. Theoretical Model and Construction of Variables  
Based on the objectives of the study the theoretical models have been 
designed as: 
SUSTAIN = f (CORRP, INSTAB, INF, TOPEN, RESOUR)      (3) 
CORRP = f (INSTAB, SUSTAIN, GINI, UNEMP)   (4) 
INSTAB = f (SUSTAIN, CORRP, GINI, MEDIA)  (5) 
where SUSTAIN = Sustainable development (Sustainable 
development index), CORRP = Corruption (Control of corruption 
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index)
11
, INSTAB = Political instability (Political instability index), 
INF = Inflation (Consumer price index), TOPEN = Trade openness 
(Exports + imports as % of GDP), RESOUR = Resource intensity 
(Resource intensity index), GINI = GINI index, UNEMP = 
Unemployment (Unemployment rate) , MEDIA = Media reach 
(Media reach index) 
Table 1: Dimensions and Indicators of Sustainable Development Index 
Dimension and  
sub-Dimensions  
Indicators Direction  
Economic  
Dimension 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of 
population). 
- 
Poverty gap at $1.90 a day 






Total net enrolment in primary 
education 
+ 
Gross enrollment ratio, 
primary, both sexes (%) 
+ 
Gross enrollment ratio, 
secondary, both sexes (%) 
+ 
Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, 
both sexes (%) 
+ 
Fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) 
- 
Health status Prevalence of HIV, total (% of 
population ages 15-49) 
- 
Tuberculosis death rate per year 
per 100000 people 
- 
Government 
effort to enhance 
education 
Government expenditure on 




CO2 emissions (metric tons per 
capita) 
- 
Energy use (kg of oil 
equivalent) per $1,000 GDP 
(constant 2011 PPP) 
- 
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Serra (2006) has shown that corruption index and Graft index are highly correlated 
which signifies the consistency in the evaluation. We have used the control of 
corruption index by World Bank (d’Agostino, Dunne & Pieroni, 2016). Meon and 
Sekkat (2005) have explained that corruption perception index and World Bank 
corruption index stand as complements to each other for analysis. Although the 
control of corruption index is criticized (Donchev & Ujhelyi 2014) but it provides a 
comparatively larger number of observations than any alternative measure.  
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Sustainable development index is constructed by three-
dimensional approach, i.e. economic, environmental and social through 
principle component analysis. Political instability index is based on 
three-dimensions following Jong-A-Pin (2009) and is constructed by 
principle component analysis. 
Table 2: Dimensions and Indicators of Political Instability Index 




Political stability and absence of 
violence (government stability, ethnic 




Civil war + 
Assassination of executive + 




Polarization  + 
Fractionalization  + 
Instability of the 
Political Regime  
Regime changes  + 
Coups d’état (successful coups, 
attempted coups)   
+ 
The resource intensity index is also constructed by principal 
component analysis. It is proxy for natural resource abundance and 
comprised of two variables.  





Indicators  Desired Value 
Ore and metal exports (Ores and metals 
exports as percentage of merchandise 
exports) 
+ 
Fuel exports (Fuel exports as percentage 
of merchandise exports) 
+ 
3.5. Econometric Estimation 
The simultaneous equations model was used purposely for explaining 
the potential endogeneity of numerous explanatory variables. The 
existence of endogeneity in the independent variables creates a serious 
econometric problem. Since OLS does not differentiate between 
endogenous and exogenous explanatory variables in the equation so 
endogeneity may leads to the inconsistency and bias OLS estimations. 
The problem becomes severe when least squares are applied directly to 
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estimate the equation using explanatory endogenous variables Yh 
which are correlated with the disturbance terms εh, even in probability 
limit. The issue may be solved and the estimator may be formed 
consistent with the disturbance terms by replacing these variables with 
appropriate instruments, in the probability limit. To search the 
instruments is generally problematic but two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method has the capability to replace explanatory endogenous variables 
with their estimated values. The use of 2SLS in cross-section regression 
makes the estimated parameters consistent, but not efficient. To 
improve the results of 2SLS some improvement is needed. For the 
purpose the three stage least squares (3SLS) technique is framed. It is 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS as it uses information on the 
correlation of the disturbance terms of the structural equations and 
improves asymptotic efficiency. 
First of all to check the endogeneity in the model, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test has been applied. It is needed to justify the necessity to 
use the instrumental variables. The estimated prob value is determined as 
0.0000, that is less than 5 percent so the null hypothesis is rejected and 
endogeneity is found in the model and instrument variables are need to 
remove the endogeneity. The mathematical forms of the models for the 
current analysis are given as: 
SUSTAINit = β0 + β1 CORRPit + β2 INSTABit + β3 INFit + β4 
TOPENit + β5 RESOURit + εεit 
(6) 
CORRPit = ɤ0 + ɤ1 INSTABit + ɤ2 SUSTAINit + ɤ3 GINIit +  
ɤ4UNEMPit + εεit 
(7) 
INSTABit = δ0 + δ1 SUSTAINit + δ2 CORRPit + δ3 GINIit + δ4 
MEDIAit   + εεit 
(8) 
In above equations SUSTAIN, CORRP and INSTAB are endogenous 
variables and INF, TOPEN, RESOURCE, GINI, UNEMP and 
MEDIA are instrumental variables. 
3.3. Data Source 
Annual panel data of 28 developing countries for the year 2000-2014 has 
been taken from the World Development Indicator (World Bank, 
2016b), Political Risk Services (International Country Risk Guide, 
2014), INSCR Data Page (INSCR 2016), The Database of Political 
Institutions 2015 (DPI2015) (Cruz, Keefer & Scartascini, 2015), Armed 
Conflict database (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2014), 
Corruption, Political Instability and Sustainable Development                          | 69 
Journal of Quantitative Methods                                               Volume 3(1): 2019 
Millennium Development Goals (World Bank, 2016a) and World 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010)
12
. 
4. Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics expressed in table 4 shows that corruption is 
prevalent in developing economies as the mean of corruption (CORRP) 
is -0.54 while maximum value is 0.76. The lower value represents the 
lower control of corruption or high existence of corruption (the reverse of 
World Bank index). The political instability and sustainable development 
are at middle level in the sample of the economies.   
Table 4: Summary Statics of the Variables (Developing Economies) 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
SUSTAIN 74.0977 8.1157 46.6400 95.0100 
CORRP -0.5461 0.4014 -1.4444 0.7612 
INSTAB 6.0133 1.9269 1.7400 12.2400 
INF 9.3912 12.8947 -1.4200 168.6200 
TOPEN 77.5192 34.4534 21.8500 163.3400 
RESOUR 13.9940 13.1200 0.2300 47.2700 
GINI 42.6022 10.2196 16.2300 63.0000 
UNEMP 8.0578 4.7160 0.5000 35.9000 
MEDIA 62.2522 43.9419 0.3800 172.7300 
4.1. Estimates for Sustainable Development  
The 3SLS estimates of sustainable development for developing 
economies, lower-middle-income economies and upper-middle income 
economies are shown in table 5. Wald test is applied to see the 
significance of variables. P value of Wald test is less than 5 percent so 
the null hypothesis is rejected and hypothesis, i.e. corruption (CORRP) 
and political instability (INSTAB) had significant effect on sustainable 
development is accepted
13
.The results reveal that corruption has negative 
                                                          
12
The selection of the countries is based on availability of data. The countries included 
in the analysis are: Armenia, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Pakistan and Ukraine (lower-middle income economies) and Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., 
Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russian Fed., 
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela (upper-middle income economies). The ranks of 




is negative. According to Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2008: example 
312) when using generalized least squares, instrumental variables or two-stage least 
squares, for any estimator but least squares, the identity SST = SSR + SSE does not 
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impact on sustainable development in developing economies, lower-
middle income economies and upper-middle income economies. The 
effect is comparatively lesser in upper-middle income economies. 
Basically it supports the theory of sand in wheels which explains that 
corruption negatively affects the economic growth due to inefficient 
allocation of resources and bad decision making (Svensson, 2005). Tanzi 
and Davoodi, (1998) showed that higher levels of corruption exist in the 
bigger public investments in less productive areas. Mo (2001) evidenced 
that human capital is adversely affected by corruption. It also negatively 
affects foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000) which consequent on an 
unfavorable effect on socioeconomic development. The political 
instability has also shown negative effect on sustainable development for 
developing economies and lower-middle income economies. For higher-
middle income economies the result is insignificant.  
Political instability destroys physical capital and displaces 
human capital. The political disorder, civil war, ethnic conflicts and mass 
violence reduce production activity and investment that influences 
economic performance and hurdles the sustainable development. 
Political instability in the form of polarization, regime change and coup 
d’etat disrupts the long term economic and environmental policies 
favorable for sustainable development. It affects sustainable 
development through lower physical and human capital accumulation. 
The literature on political instability and economic development has 
empirically proved the devastating effect of political instability on 
development of the economies (Jong-A-Pin 2009; Aisen & Veiga 2013; 
Radu 2015). It partially supports the adverse impact of political 
instability on sustainable development.  
The inflation has been found to negatively influence the 
sustainable development in developing economies and upper-middle 
income economies. It may be explained through the costs of inflation, 
given by Fischer and Modigliani (1978), as taxation on capital that 
implies an inverse effect of inflation on economic growth. Similarly, the 
high inflation rate reflects high uncertainty or risk and consequently low 
investment that squeeze domestic market and decreases foreign direct 
investment as well as accelerate capital flight that results into decreased 
economic growth and development (Fischer, 1993).  
                                                                                                                                  
hold, so the usual R
2 
= 1 – SSE/SST can produce negative number. This just shows 
that the goodness of fit is not appropriate in this context, and should be ignored.  
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The trade openness positively impacts the sustainable 
development in all the three categories of the economies. Trade 
openness raises standards of living, ensures full employment, enhances 
the local and international demand, expands production and adaptation 
of technology, and increases the bulk and quality of commodity and 
services traded which results into optimal utilization of resources 
globally. These are the basic pillars to sustainable development. The 
trade openness seeks to protect the resources, nature and environment, 
improves the techniques for preserving resources for future generations, 
and enhances the economic and social mobility among the nations. 
The sustainable development is inversely influenced by the 
resource intensity. It creates the replica of resource curse hypothesis 
applicable for sustainable development
14
. Sachs and Warner (2001) 
identified a puzzle, but more pointedly a paradox, about the association 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth. The 
resource-abundance countries should have higher levels of investments 
and thereby growth rates but the resource-poor economies like Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand are excelling in economic growth and ranking as 
world’s star performers. These economies are also doing well in 
education and health. This paradox is explained through four major 
economic phenomena, i.e. lower prices of natural resource are offered 
to resource-rich countries in global markets, the demand of natural 
resources is decreasing globally due to innovation particularly in 
developed economies, the fluctuations are happening in exchange rate 
which remains unfavorable to exporters of resource-rich countries 
(Auty & Mikesell, 1998), and finally the sophisticated progress in 
capital and technology like digital innovations in export sector of 
resource-poor countries give them advantage in local production and 
international trade. The economists and environmentalists advocate that 
wise use of resources by the resource-rich economies for physical and 
human capital may enhance sustainable development in these 
countries.  
4.2.  Estimates for Corruption 
The results of 3SLS estimates for corruption are shown in table 6. This 
study hypothesized that political instability enhances corruption but the 
                                                          
14
The resource curse is supported by a number of studies (Sachs & Warner, 2001; 
Auty, 2001; Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Gylfason & Zoega, 2006). 
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current analysis has shown that political instability decreases corruption 
in developing economies, lower-middle income economies and upper-
middle income economies. The results are partially supported by 
Compante, Chor and Do (2009) who found that very stable economies 
and very unstable economies suffer the higher levels of corruption as 
compared to the economies at intermediate range of stability. They 
have given the examples of Mexico during the more than seventy years 
long regime of Institutional Revolutionary Party, the economy of 
Kenya during the rule of five times elected Daniel Arap Moi and 
military based long period Suharto government in Indonesia where 
political stability and corruption existed side by side
15
.  
The sustainable development negatively affects the corruption 
in all the three categories of economies. A society with sustainable 
development ensures good environmental condition, human capital 
accumulation through education and health, and lower level of poverty 
which retards incentive for corruption because people live in good 
living conditions. Income inequality has shown positive affect on 
corruption in developing economies only.  
The literature has identified income inequality as a significant 
determinant of corruption (Zhang, Cao & Vaughn, 2009; Mehrara, 
Firouzjaee & Gholami, 2011; Justesen & Bjornskov, 2014). It explains 
that in unequal societies, political corruption rises because poor people 
become interested to sell their votes to receive gifts, money and other 
favors and rich ones become interested to buy votes of poor people to 
keep their political status and power to obtain more benefits. Similarly 
poor community becomes corrupt to meet the basic needs like food and 
shelter through jobs. These jobs are distributed by bureaucrats through 
bribes.  
The unemployment is a major issue of developing economies. 
In our sample the average unemployment rate is estimated at 8 percent. 
The maximum rate remains at 35.9 percent. The unemployment is 
included in corruption equation to see its implications. It has shown 
positive effect on corruption in developing economies, lower-middle 
income and upper-middle income economies.  
                                                          
15
However, on the other end there is example of Pakistan where political instability and 
higher corruption existed parallel to each other (Easterly 2001) and of Brazil for the 
same type of phenomenon in the last decade of previous century.   
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Azeng and Yogo (2013) also found positive effect of 
unemployment on corruption. Higher unemployment increases poverty 
and inequality which instigate the unemployed mass to involve in 
corruption for their livelihood. Another channel for the effect of 
unemployment on corruption in an economy may be through the 
political and bureaucratic figures. The politicians and bureaucrats 
become involved in rent seeking from the employment schemes and 
programs. The unemployed persons remain ready to give bribes for 
employment particularly in public sector jobs.   
4.3. Estimates for Political Instability 
The 3SLS estimates for political instability are shown in table 6 which 
shows that sustainable development and corruption both negatively 
affect the political instability for all three categories of the economies. 
The results depict the negative effect of sustainable development on 
political instability much stronger in lower middle income economies 
as compared to developing economies and upper-middle income 
economies. The overall results explain that higher level of sustainable 
development reflects lower level of poverty, higher education 
enrolment, good health facilities and pollution free environment which 
satisfy the people about governmental affairs and decreases political 
unrest or instability. Most of the existing literature is concerned with 
economic growth and political instability but we are concerned with 
sustainable development and political instability. Our results may have 
the partial support from existing literature about economic growth and 
political instability (Alesina et al., 1996; Gyimah-Brempong & De 
Camacho, 1998; Miljkovic & Rimal, 2008; Aisen & Veiga, 2013; 
Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Radu, 2015). 
It is strange to observe that corruption decreases political 
instability and the association between corruption and political 
instability is almost three times stronger in lower-middle income 
economies as compared to upper-middle income economies. It explains 
that corruption creates political stability. The political and bureaucratic 
corruption may smooth the political instability when the ruling class 
and the policy makers are involved in corruption and use the rent for 
prolonging their status and power. The lower class of the society 
suffers but it remains unable to make some efforts for regime change 
and political unrest (Compante, Chor & Do, 2009).   
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Inequality increases political instability due to higher 
dissatisfaction of public about government policies regarding distribution 
of resources. It augments the social dissatisfaction and energizes civil 
unrest by increasing probability of coups, civil conflicts and mass 
violence. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
It is concluded that there is interdependence among corruption, political 
instability and sustainable development. Both corruption and political 
instability adversely affect sustainable development. Corruption impedes 
sustainable development because it distorts decision making process, 
decreases human capital and private investment, and reduces social 
services like healthcare and education.  
Political instability and sustainable development negatively 
affect corruption. It means that political stability enhances corruption. In 
developing economies whenever the ruling class avail the opportunity of 
political stability it becomes involved in corruption. It also reflects the 
existence of mass corruption in developing economies in political and 
bureaucratic groups. They use the money taken through corruption to 
prolong the regimes and their status quo. However, the sustainable 
development decreases the corruption and political instability. So the 
economies moving towards sustainable development have the benefits of 
decease in corruption, and ethnic conflicts, civil wars, mass violence and 
polarization.  
The major focus of the study was sustainable development and 
the way it was linked with corruption and political instability and vice 
versa. The results have shown an important aspect in this troika of 
variables, that is corruption increases political stability, and political 
stability increases corruption. It gives a clue that in developing 
economies the politicians and bureaucrats are involved in corruption and 
the rulers, administration and policy makers have a strong hold on the 
public reactions. They earn money from corruption and use it for 
prolonging the rule. So the first fist to break this cycle is to eliminate 
corruption, then sustainable development may be attained.   
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